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Abstract— In this paper, a novel approach is introduced to
study the achievable delay-guaranteed secrecy rate, by introduc-
ing the concept of the effective secrecy rate (ESR). This study
focuses on the downlink of a non-orthogonal multiple access
(NOMA) network with one base station, multiple single-antenna
NOMA users and an eavesdropper. Two possible eavesdropping
scenarios are considered: 1) an internal, unknown, eavesdropper
in a purely antagonistic network; and 2) an external eavesdropper
in a network with trustworthy peers. For a purely antagonistic
network with an internal eavesdropper, the only receiver with
a guaranteed positive ESR is the one with the highest channel
gain. A closed-form expression is obtained for the ESR at high
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) values, showing that the strongest
user’s ESR in the high SNR regime approaches a constant
value irrespective of the power coefficients. Furthermore, it is
shown the strongest user can achieve higher ESR if it has a
distinctive advantage in terms of channel gain with respect to
the second strongest user. For a trustworthy NOMA network
with an external eavesdropper, a lower bound and an upper
bound on the ESR are proposed and investigated for an arbitrary
legitimate user. For the lower bound, a closed-form expression
is derived in the high SNR regime. For the upper bound, the
analysis shows that if the external eavesdropper cannot attain
any channel state information (CSI), the legitimate NOMA user
at high SNRs can always achieve positive ESR, and the value of it
depends on the power coefficients. Simulation results numerically
validate the accuracy of the derived closed-form expressions and
verify the analytical results given in the theorems and lemmas.
Index Terms— Effective capacity, secrecy rate, NOMA, delay-
outage probability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
NON-ORTHOGONAL multiple access (NOMA) isconsidered to be a promising multiple access (MA)
technique for fifth generation (5G) and beyond (B5G)
networks, because of its advantages over conventional
orthogonal multiple access (OMA) schemes, in terms of
spectral efficiency [1], cell-edge throughput [2], and energy
efficiency [3]. Power-domain NOMA1 allows multiple users
to transmit with different transmission power levels, but using
the same radio resources, such as subcarrier channels, codes
and time slots [4], [5]. Specifically, superposition coding
is applied at the transmitter to enable user-multiplexing,
while multiuser separation techniques such as successive
interference cancellation (SIC) are applied at the receiver
to eliminate the co-channel interference and decode the
superimposed messages [6], [7]. The users with higher
channel gains can obtain the prior information of weaker
users in accordance with the NOMA principle. On one
hand, the obtained prior information can be utilized to
help the weaker users to decode their messages [2],
but as mentioned in [8], this can also cause security
issues.
Providing secure communication has always been an impor-
tant issue in wireless networks. Traditionally, security is
carried out at upper layers of the protocol stack, relying
on encryption algorithms which are agnostic to the wireless
channels’ physical properties [9], [10]. However, in 5G and
Internet of things (IoT) networks, with the explosive growth
in the number of low-complexity, power and computationally
constrained devices, the concept of physical layer security
(PLS) is attracting considerable attention. PLS exploits the
randomness of wireless channels to ensure that the transmitted
information cannot be decoded by a malicious eavesdropper
[10], [11]. Based on the concept of perfect secrecy proposed by
Shannon [12], Wyner introduced the wiretap channel model, in
which two legitimate users can communicate reliably through
a main channel while keeping the exchanged messages con-
fidential from an eavesdropper. Considering Gaussian wiretap
channels, the secrecy capacity, i.e., the maximum achievable
rate which guarantees reliable communication while the eaves-
dropper cannot decode any confidential message, is equal to
the difference between the main channel’s Shannon capac-
ity and the adversary channel’s Shannon capacity [9], [13].
Consequently, confidential transmission in Gaussian wiretap
1In the following sections, the power-domain NOMA is simply referred to
as NOMA.
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channels requires that the legitimate user’s channel has a
higher signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) than the wiretap channel
[11]. On the other hand, the ergodic secrecy capacity for
wireless fading channels can be positive even when the adver-
sary has a higher average SNR than the legitimate user’s
channel, which indicates that fading can be beneficial for
secrecy [11]. This is because whenever the legitimate user
experiences a higher channel gain than the eavesdropper, this
fading realization can be exploited for secure transmission [9].
Focusing on large-scale networks utilizing the NOMA pro-
tocol, PLS was investigated in [14] and [15] by invoking
stochastic geometry. By adopting a user pairing technique
which allows two mobile users to share one orthogonal radio
resource, the exact analytical expressions for the secrecy out-
age probability were derived and analyzed for single-antenna
and multiple-antenna scenarios [15]. In [16], the feasible
transmit power region was first identified to maximize the
sum of secrecy rates for a single-input single-output NOMA
system, which satisfies all users’ required quality-of-service
(QoS) values. Then, a closed-form expression was derived
for the proposed optimal power allocation strategy. In [17],
a network in which the source and an untrusted relay simulta-
neously transmit signals through non-orthogonal channels was
considered. It was concluded that the proposed non-orthogonal
relaying scheme provides an improved ergodic secrecy rate,
compared to the conventional orthogonal relaying schemes.
Although investigating the secrecy capacity in different
wireless networks with the NOMA protocol applied, the
aforementioned literature adopts the physical layer channel
model, i.e., Shannon theory, without placing emphasis on the
legitimate users’ delay requirements. On the other hand, for the
emerging delay-sensitive wireless communication networks
and applications [18], such as vehicular communications,
e-health communication and Tactile Internet, delay QoS guar-
antees will play a critical role in 5G and beyond 5G networks.
Furthermore, in future wireless networks, users are expected
to necessitate flexible delay guarantees for achieving different
service requirements. Henceforth, in order to satisfy diverse
delay requirements, a simple and flexible delay QoS model
is imperative to be applied and investigated. In this respect,
the effective capacity (EC) theory was proposed in [19], with
EC denoting the maximum constant arrival rate which can
be served by a given service process, while guaranteeing
the required statistical delay provisioning. By considering
the secrecy rate as the given service rate, we propose in
turn the novel concept of the effective secrecy rate (ESR);
ESR represents the maximum constant arrival rate that can
be securely served, on the condition that the required delay
constraint can be statistically satisfied.
In this paper, focusing on a downlink NOMA network
with one base station (BS), multiple single-antenna mobile
users and an eavesdropper, we aim to propose and thor-
oughly analyze the ESR for delay-sensitive NOMA users.
Different from the user paring design in [14] and [15], we
assume that all legitimate NOMA users can transmit using
the same resource slot. To provide a comprehensive study,
two different eavesdropping scenarios are considered in this
paper. Firstly, a purely antagonistic network is studied, in
which every NOMA user can act as a passive eavesdropper
intercepting confidential messages intended for other users. A
practical scenario for this case would be ad-hoc networks with
confidential information broadcasted with existing untrusted
peers [10]. Secondly, when all NOMA users are trustworthy,
there may exist an external eavesdropper that has an interest in
compromising the network’s security. Hence, with an external
eavesdropper intending to decode the NOMA users’ messages,
the ESR of an arbitrary legitimate user is proposed and inves-
tigated, while satisfying their corresponding statistical delay
requirement.
Considering the above eavesdropping scenarios, this paper
has the following main contributions:
• After proposing the concept of ESR, we theoretically
analyze the impact of delay exponent θ on ESR and pro-
vide Theorem 1. It is proved that the ESR monotonically
decreases with θ. Specifically, we prove that when θ → 0,
the ESR converges to the traditional ergodic secrecy rate,
while when θ → ∞, it represents the delay-limited case
and simulation results show that the value of ESR reduces
to zero, for Rayleigh fading channels.
• In the presence of an unknown internal eavesdropper,
the only legitimate receiver which can achieve a non-
zero secrecy rate is the user with the highest channel
gains.2 For the strongest user, we derive the closed-
form expressions for the ESR and the traditional ergodic
secrecy rate, at high SNRs. Furthermore, we show that
the strongest user can achieve higher ESR if it has
a distinctive advantage in terms of channel gain with
respect to the second strongest user. Also, it is proved that
the ESR in the high SNR regime approaches a constant
value irrespective of the power coefficients.
• In the presence of a malicious external eavesdropper,
a lower bound and an upper bound are respectively
analyzed for the ESR and the traditional ergodic secrecy
rate.3 For the lower bound, the closed-form expressions
are derived for the high SNR regime. For the upper
bound, the analysis shows that if the external eavesdrop-
per cannot attain any channel state information (CSI),
the legitimate NOMA user in the high SNR regime can
always achieve positive delay-guaranteed secrecy rate,
and the value of it depends on the power coefficients.
• Simulation results verify the accuracy of the derived
closed-form expressions and confirm the tightness of the
proposed bounds. The impact of the delay requirements,
the size of the NOMA set and the power coefficient
settings is also investigated. Specifically, it is shown
that when there is an external eavesdropper, a legiti-
mate NOMA user with stronger channel gains will be
more impacted in terms of its achievable ESR, in order
to guarantee a required statistical delay QoS. Further,
numerical results also reveal that a larger user set leads
to smaller ESR values for the legitimate users in both
eavesdropping scenarios.
2Hereafter, the user with the highest channel gain is referred to as the
strongest user.
3We note that in this case, these results are not limited to the strongest user.
YU et al.: EFFECTIVE SECRECY RATE FOR A DOWNLINK NOMA NETWORK 5675
The rest of the paper is organised as following: the system
model is discussed in Section II. The theory of EC is briefly
reviewed in Section III, followed by analytical expressions
of the ESR for the scenarios of an internal and an external
eavesdropper, respectively. Section IV includes simulation
results and discussions, followed by conclusions summarized
in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A classical cellular downlink transmission is considered,
where one BS transmits public and confidential messages to
M single-antenna NOMA users in the presence of a malicious
eavesdropper. The wireless channels from the BS to legitimate
NOMA users and the eavesdropper are all assumed to be block
fading, i.e., the channel gains remain constant within each
fading-block, but independently change from one block to the
next. Each fading-block duration Tf is equal to the frame size,
which is an integer multiple of the symbol period.
The channel gains from the BS to the mth user and the
eavesdropper are assumed to be Rayleigh distributed and
denoted by hm,m ∈ {1 . . . , ,M}4 and he,5 respectively.
Without loss of generality, all NOMA users and the mali-
cious adversary’s channel gains are assumed to be ordered as
0 < |h1|2 ≤ |h2|2 . . . ≤ |hME |2 ≤ |he|2 ≤ |hME+1 |2 . . . ≤
|hM |2, in which ME indicates the number of NOMA users
that have smaller or equal channel gains with respect to the
eavesdropper. The BS transmits the signal
∑M
i=1
√
γiPsi to all
legitimate users in accordance with NOMA principle. Here, γi
is the ith user’s power coefficient, P is the total transmission
power, and si is the message for the ith user with E
[|si|2] = 1.
By following the NOMA protocol [20], the power coefficients6
are ordered as γ1 ≥ · · · ≥ γM , and
∑M
i=1 γi = 1.
The received signals ym at the mth legitimate user,
1 ≤ m ≤ M , and ye at the eavesdropper are respectively
given as [21]:
ym = hm
M∑
i=1
√
γiPsi + nm, (1)
ye = he
M∑
i=1
√
γiPsi + ne, (2)
where nm, ne denote zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) at the mth user and at the eavesdropper, respectively,
i.e., nm, ne ∼ N (0, σ2).7
Based on the NOMA principle, the mth user applies the
SIC technique to detect its own messages, by successively
decoding the weaker users’ messages, i.e., the ith user with
|hi|2 < |hm|2, and then eliminating the message from the
SNR received signals [22]. On the other hand, the messages
for the user with stronger channel gains, i.e., the ith user with
4The time index t is omitted hereafter.
5The instantaneous channel gain he is unknown, if the eavesdropper is an
external adversary.
6Adaptive power allocation can influence the exact values of ESR, but this
is beyond the scope of this paper and optimal power allocation to maximize
the network’s sum ESR is considered to be a future research topic.
7For simplicity, the noise variances at all users and the eavesdropper are
assumed to be identical and equal to σ2.
|hi|2 > |hm|2, will be considered as noise at the mth user. To
ensure that SIC is successfully applied at the mth user, it is
assumed that Ri→m ≥ R˜i [23], where Ri→m denotes the mth
user’s data rate to decode the ith user’s message and R˜i is the
target data rate for the ith user. Therefore, when it decodes
its own message, the mth legitimate NOMA user’s achievable
rate, in b/s/Hz, is given by [14]
Rm=log2
(
1+
ρ|hm|2γm
ρ|hm|2
∑M
i=m+1 γi+1
)
, 1 ≤ m≤M, (3)
where ρ is the transmit SNR, i.e., ρ = P
σ2
.
Regarding the eavesdropper, it employs SIC to detect the
mth legitimate user’s messages with an achievable decoding
rate denoted by R(m)e . Considering that the eavesdropper can
be within the set of NOMA users or distinct from them,
the corresponding mathematical expressions of R(m)e can be
different and we will study them respectively in the following
Section. The mth NOMA user’s secrecy rate is achievable
when an encoding scheme exists that simultaneously ensures
reliable communication and perfect secrecy with respect to
the eavesdropper. In the following, the m-th user’s achievable
secrecy rate is denoted by Rms and expressed as [9]
Rms =
[
Rm −R(m)e
]+
, 1 ≤ m ≤ M, (4)
where Rm is given in (3) and [x]+ = max{0, x}.
III. EFFECTIVE SECRECY RATE
In order to support the emerging delay-sensitive wireless
communication services and applications, in the following,
we first introduce the theory of EC. Then, we introduce the
concept of the ESR as an achievable arrival rate that can be
securely served, while statistically satisfying the required delay
QoS constraints. Let us take the mth user as an example.
Assume a first-in-first-out (FIFO) buffer for the mth user
at the BS.8 Define Dm(t) as the delay experienced by a
packet arriving at time t. From [19], the probability of the
delay Dm(t) exceeding a maximum delay limit Dmmax can be
estimated as
P outdelay =Pr{Dm(t) > Dmmax}≈Pr{Q(t) > 0}e−θmμD
m
max , (5)
where P outdelay denotes the delay violation probability limit for
the mth user, Pr{Q(t) > 0} is the probability of a non-empty
buffer at time t, Dmmax is the given delay bound in the unit of
symbol duration, and θm (θm > 0) represents the exponential
decay rate. The authors in [19] proved that the constant arrival
rate needs to be limited to the value of μ, which equals to
EC, so that a target delay violation probability limit can be
met. Let {Rms (t), t = 1, 2, . . .} be a series of non-negative
random variables, representing the service process of the mth
user. Assume that the service process satisfies Gärtner-Ellis
theorem [24]. Then, the EC for the mth user on a block-fading
channel is defined as
Ems = −
1
θmTfB
ln
(
E
[
e−θmTfBR
m
s
])
, (b/s/Hz) , (6)
8It is assumed that for every served user, there is one virtual buffer at the BS.
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where E [·] is the expectation over its channel gains. When the
focus is on the rate that can be securely transmitted, we can
obtain the ESR for the mth user, by inserting the achievable
secrecy rate Rms , given in (4), into (6).
From (5), it can be noted that θm denotes the exponential
decay rate of delay violation probability, for the mth user.
A smaller value of θm indicates that the user has a relatively
loose delay QoS requirement, while a larger value of θm means
that a more stringent delay QoS is required. In particular, when
θm → 0, the probability of the experienced delay exceeding
a given bound approaches one. When θm → ∞, it indicates
that the user cannot tolerate any delay outage. To clarify, we
summarize in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The ESR for the mth user, i.e., Ems in (6), is
a monotonically decreasing function in θm. When θm → 0,
Ems converges to the ergodic secrecy rate, i.e., E[Rms ]. When
θm → ∞, this represents the delay-limited scenario and the
value of Ems reduces to zero.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 shows that the proposed ESR, describing the
delay-guaranteed secrecy rate,9 contains a delay exponent θm
indicating the stringency of delay requirement. Specifically,
this theorem reveals that the ESR is a more general perfor-
mance metric, which includes the traditional ergodic secrecy
rate at an extreme case. For delay-limited scenarios, i.e., when
θm →∞, the value of Ems reduces to zero for Rayliegh fading
channels, which will be shown in Section IV.
A. Effective Secrecy Rate With an Internal Eavesdropper
In this section, we first consider a purely antagonistic
network in which every user can be a potential eavesdropper
intercepting the confidential messages of the other users.
Assume that the knowledge of CSI for all legitimate users
is perfectly known at the BS, which implies that the internal
eavesdropper’s CSI is available. Note that by applying SIC, the
user with the strongest channel gains can successfully decode
the information of other NOMA users which have weaker
channel gains. Hence, when there is an untrusted internal
adversary, the only legitimate receiver which can achieve a
non-zero secrecy rate is the M th user which has the strongest
channel gains. Specifically, the worst case scenario is that
the (M − 1)th user acts as the eavesdropper and intends to
detect the M th user’s messages. Then, the secrecy rate for all
legitimate users can be expressed as
Rms =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
log2
(
1 + ρ|hM |2γM
)
− log2
(
1 + ρ|hM−1|2γM
)
, m = M,
0, otherwise.
(7)
For ease and compactness, in the following we introduce the
notation: qm = ργm, Qm = ρ
M∑
i=m
γi, and βm = − θmTfBln 2 ,
where m ∈ {1, 2 . . . ,M}.
9Here, we are talking about the amount of arrival rate that can be securely
served and delay statistically guaranteed.
Then, the M th user’s ESR can be provided by inserting (7)
into (6), which yields
EMs =
1
βM
log2
(
E
[(
1 + qM |hM |2
1 + qM |hM−1|2
)βM])
. (8)
By setting y = |hM |2, and x = |hM−1|2, (8) can be
expanded as
EMs =
1
βM
log2
( ∫∫
0<x<∞
y≥x
(
1 + qMy
1 + qMx
)βM
× f(M−1,M)(x, y) dxdy
)
, (9)
where f(M−1,M)(x, y) denotes the joint probability density
function (PDF) of the ordered channel gains |hM−1|2 and
|hM |2, with |hM−1|2 ≤ |hM |2. For M unordered independent
channel gains which are Rayleigh distributed with a unit-
variance, we define the PDFs of the unordered |hM−1|2 and
|hM |2 as f(x) and f(y), respectively. Then, the cumulative
distribution functions (CDF) of the unordered channel gains
are given as F (x) and F (y). When all users’ channel gains
are ordered, the statistical features follow the theory of order
statistics [25]. Hence, the joint PDF of the ordered |hM−1|2
and |hM |2, with |hM−1|2 ≤ |hM |2, is given by [25]
f(M−1,M)(x, y) = M (M − 1) f(x) (F (x))M−2 f(y). (10)
Finally, by inserting the joint PDF f(M−1,M)(x, y) into (9),
we provide the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Suppose that there is an internal eavesdropper
among all NOMA users. Considering the worst case scenario,
the M th user’s achievable ESR can be written as
EMsc = BM +
1
βM
log2
(
M−2∑
ν=0
(
M − 2
ν
)
(−1)νe νqM
×
∞∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
(ν + 1)k
k − βM + 1
[
Γ
(
k + 2,
1
qM
)
−
(
1
qM
)k−βM+1
× Γ
(
1 + βM ,
1
qM
)])
, (11)
where BM =
ln(M(M−1))+2q−1M
βM ln 2
and Γ(·, ·) is the incomplete
Γ function.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Note that it is difficult to directly analyze (11) and to obtain
intuition of the impact of the various parameters on the ESR.
To obtain a tractable expression, in the following, we derive
the closed-form expression for EMs at high SNRs. Firstly, at
high SNRs, i.e., ρ
 1, RMs can be simplified to
lim
ρ→∞R
M
s = log2
( |hM |2
|hM−1|2
)
. (12)
The ergodic secrecy rate at high SNRs, i.e., lim
ρ→∞E[R
M
s ],
equals to E
[
log2
(
|hM |2
|hM−1|2
)]
. This shows that at high SNRs,
the M th user’s ergodic secrecy rate depends only on the (ratio
of) channel gains between the M th user and the internal
eavesdropper.
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Then, the ESR at high SNRs for the M th user, denoted as
lim
ρ→∞E
M
s , can be expressed as
lim
ρ→∞E
M
s =
1
βM
log2
(
E
[( |hM |2
|hM−1|2
)βM])
. (13a)
Comparing to the case of the ergodic capacity, we can clearly
see the impact of the exponential delay decay exponent cap-
tuted in βM . From (13a), we can note that for a fixed value
of delay factor βM , the ESR value at high SNRs increases
with the ratio of channel gains. This demonstrates that the
M th user can achieve higher delay-guaranteed secrecy rate if
it has a distinctive advantage in terms of channel gain with
respect to second in rank user. By setting y = |hM |2, and
x = |hM−1|2, (13a) can be expanded as
lim
ρ→∞E
M
s =
1
βM
log2
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
∫∫
0<x<∞
y≥x
(y
x
)βM
f(M−1,M)(x, y) dxdy
⎞
⎟⎟⎠.
(14)
After applying the joint PDF f(M−1,M)(x, y), we derive the
closed-form expressions for lim
ρ→∞E
M
s and limρ→∞E
[
RMs
]
in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3: Suppose that there is an unknown internal
eavesdropper among all NOMA users. Considering the worst
case scenario, the closed-form expression for the M th user’s
ESR at high SNRs, i.e., lim
ρ→∞E
M
s , is given by
lim
ρ→∞E
M
s =
1
βM
log2
(
M(M − 1)Γ(1− βM )
×
M−2∑
s=0
(
M − 2
s
)
(−1)s2F1
[
1− βM , 2
2− βM ;−1− s
])
, (15)
where Γ(·) is gamma function and 2F1
[
a, b
c ; z
]
is the gen-
eralized hypergeometric function [26]. Furthermore, for com-
parison purposes, the ergodic secrecy rate for the M th user
at high SNRs, i.e., lim
ρ→∞E
[
RMs
]
, can be expressed in closed-
form, given in (16).
lim
ρ→∞E[R
M
s ] = M(M − 1)
M−2∑
s=0
(
M − 2
s
)
×(−1)s 1
s + 1
log2 (s + 2) . (16)
Proof: See Appendix C.
From (15), we can notice that when the transmit SNR
asymptotically approaches infinity, the M th user’s ESR
approaches a constant value, irrespective of the transmit
SNR and the power coefficients. Furthermore, from (15) and
(16), one can note that when the M th user’s delay requirement
changes (when βM varies), lim
ρ→∞E
[
RMs
]
will not change but
the value of ESR, i.e., lim
ρ→∞E
M
s , will be influenced. This is
due to the fact that the delay violation probability is not taken
into account in traditional secrecy rate, but is considered in
the proposed ESR. This demonstrates the gains in considering
the delay-guaranteed ESR in low-latency communications.
The validity of the above derived closed-form expressions,
given in (15) and (16), will be verified in Section IV, by com-
paring with Monte Carlo results. Moreover, simulation results
will also show that lim
ρ→∞E
M
s converges to limρ→∞E
[
RMs
]
, when
θM → 0 (or βM → 0). In other words, we can get that
lim
ρ→∞
θM→0
EMs = limρ→∞E
[
RMs
]
. This verifies Theorem 1 and
confirms that the proposed ESR is a more flexible metric,
with the traditional ergodic secrecy rate emerging as a special
case.
B. Effective Secrecy Rate With an External Eavesdropper
Here, we assume that all NOMA users are trustworthy and
there exists an external eavesdropper which is distinct from
the set of legitimate users and intends to decode as many
NOMA users’ confidential messages as possible. Then, by
employing SIC, the adversary’s achievable rate for detecting
the mth user’s message, namely R(m)e , can be given in (17)
[21], shown at the top of the next page.
By inserting (3) and (17) into (4) and applying the
defined notations qm = ργm, Qm = ρ
M∑
i=m
γi, where
m = {1, 2, . . . ,M}, the secrecy rate for the mth user can
be then given in (18), shown at the top of the next page.
Firstly, when 1 ≤ m ≤ ME , i.e., |hm|2 ≤ |he|2, we
have that log2
(
1 + qm|hm|
2
Qm+1|hm|2+1
)
is smaller than or equal to
log2
(
1 + qm|he|
2
Qm+1|he|2+1
)
, which means that Rms = 0. On the
other hand, when ME + 1 ≤ m ≤M , we have 1|hm|2 ≤ 1|he|2
and Qm+1 ≤ QME+1 − qm. This means that Rms ≥ 0, when
ME + 1 ≤ m ≤ M . Hence, the secrecy rate Rms can be
simplified to (19), shown at the top of the next page.
Assume that the relative order of all NOMA users and the
eavesdropper’s channel gains is known, i.e., 0 < |h1|2 ≤
|h2|2 . . . ≤ |hME |2 ≤ |he|2 ≤ |hME+1 |2 . . . ≤ |hM |2. Then,
by inserting (19) into (6), we have the conditional ESR,
namely Emcs , given below.
Case 1: for the mth user with 1 ≤ m ≤ ME
In this case, it is known that the mth user has weaker channel
gains compared to the eavesdropper, i.e., |hm|2 ≤ |he|2. Under
this condition, by inserting (19) into (6), we have that Emcs = 0.
Case 2: for the mth user with ME + 1 ≤ m ≤ M
In this case, it is known that the mth user has stronger
channel gains compared to the eavesdropper, i.e., |hm|2 ≥
|he|2. Under this condition, we can get that
Emcs =
1
βm
log2
(
E
[(
Qm|hm|2 + 1
Qm+1|hm|2 + 1
× (QME+1 − qm) |he|
2 + 1
QME+1|he|2 + 1
)βm])
. (20)
At this point, a short note on the circumstances under which
the ESR can be evaluated is in place. The design of secrecy
encoders utilizes so the called (double) binning techniques
and relies on full CSI knowledge, i.e., both the legitimate
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R(m)e =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
log2
(
1 +
ρ|he|2γm
ρ|he|2
∑M
i=m+1 γi + 1
)
, 1 ≤ m ≤ Me,
log2
(
1 +
ρ|he|2γm
ρ|he|2
∑M
i=ME+1,i=m γi + 1
)
, ME + 1 ≤ m ≤M,
(17)
Rms =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[
log2
(
1 +
qm|hm|2
Qm+1|hm|2 + 1
)
− log2
(
1 +
qm|he|2
Qm+1|he|2 + 1
)]+
, 1 ≤ m ≤ ME ,[
log2
(
1 +
qm|hm|2
Qm+1|hm|2 + 1
)
− log2
(
1 +
qm|he|2
(QME+1 − qm) |he|2 + 1
)]+
, ME + 1 ≤ m ≤ M,
(18)
Rms =
⎧⎨
⎩
0, 1 ≤ m ≤ ME,
log2
(
1 +
qm|hm|2
Qm+1|hm|2 + 1
)
− log2
(
1 +
qm|he|2
(QME+1 − qm) |he|2 + 1
)
, ME + 1 ≤ m ≤ M,
(19)
and the eavesdropper’s CSI need to be readily available. This
assumption is reasonable in the internal eavesdropper scenario,
as the in the NOMA network the source (BS) needs the full
CSI to perform the power allocation among the users; indeed,
the scenario of a NOMA network with internal eavesdroppers
provides an excellent example of how an eavesdropper’s CSI
can be known to the legitimate transmitter.
On the other hand, in the external eavesdropper case, this
assumption is no longer viable; an external passive attacker
would indeed have every incentive to conceal themselves and
not leak information regarding their actual CSI. However, there
is a fundamental difference between a network’s secrecy rate
and effective secrecy rate. Inspecting the expression in (19)
for the ESR, it is clear that it involves an expectation over the
distribution of the attacker’s channel gains when the legitimate
receiver is stronger than the attacker. What is notably different
with respect to the evaluation of the secrecy rate, is the fact
that in essence only the order – in terms of received SNR
– of the eavesdropper among the set of M NOMA users
comes into play, as opposed to the case of the secrecy rate
in which the exact eavesdropper’s SNR needs to be known
for the evaluation.
This in turn, is consistent with the way the CSI is fedback
to the BS in the uplink of actual systems, such as LTE and
NB-IoT, in which instead of the exact CSI and SNR values,
an SNR range is determined in the form of a “channel quality
indicator” (CQI) [27]. In a realistic setting, it is therefore
conceivable that with the aid of artificial noise techniques [28]
it is possible to control the range of SNRs that are attainable
by the attacker and provide the legitimate users the opportunity
to feedback to the BS relevant information regarding the CQI
of a potential eavesdropper, therefore removing ambiguities in
the evaluation of the ESR.
In terms of the actual design of the secrecy encoders,
although it is beyond the scope of the present work, it can
be argued that in dense NOMA networks with multiple CQI
levels, this information can be taken into account in the design,
accounting for the worst case scenario in which the SNR of
the eavesdropper is assumed to be in the upper limit of the
respective CQI range. Such an approach would of course need
to be taken into account in the evaluation of the ESR, but at
this point is left as future work.
To calculate Emcs , we define z1 = |hm|2, z2 = |he|2, and
note that the joint PDF f(z1, z2) = f(m)(z1)f(z2).10 Here,
f(m)(z1) is the PDF of the ordered mth user’s channel gains
following order statistics and f(z2) is the PDF of the external
adversary’s channel gains, which is Rayleigh distributed with
unit variance. From the theory of order statistics, we have that
f(m)(z1) = ψmf(z1) (1− F (z1))M−m F (z1)m−1. (21)
Here, ψm = 1B(m,M−m+1) and B(μ,w) is the beta function,
i.e., B(μ,w) = Γ(μ)Γ(w)
(
Γ(μ + w)
)−1
, where Γ(μ) = μ!,
when μ is a positive integer. By inserting the joint PDF
f(z1, z2) into (20), we provide the following theorem.
Theorem 4: Suppose that there is an external eavesdropper.
Assume that the order of the eavesdropper’s channel gains
among the set of NOMA users is known. For the mth
user with m ≥ ME + 1, its conditional ESR, i.e., Emcs ,
can be simplified to (22), while assuming γm ≤
M∑
i=m+1
γi,
where m = {M − 1,M}, and a = M − m + 1 + s. At
high SNRs, its conditional ESR, i.e., lim
ρ→∞E
m
cs , equals to
log2
(
Qm
Qm+1
QME+1−qm
QME+1
)
.
Emcs ≈
1
βm
log2
(
ψm
(
Qm+1
Qm
)−βm(m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)s 1
a
+
βmqm
Qm+1Qm
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)se aQm Ei
(
− a
Qm
))
×
(
QME+1 − qm
QME+1
)βm (
1− βmqme
1
QME+1
(QME+1 − qm)QME+1
×Ei
(
− 1
QME+1
)))
. (22)
Proof: See Appendix D.
10The legitimate NOMA users and the external adversary are independent,
so the joint PDF is the product of two marginal PDFs.
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R˘ms =
⎧⎨
⎩log2
(
1 +
qm|hm|2
Qm+1|hm|2 + 1
)
− log2
(
1 +
qm|he|2
Qm+1|he|2 + 1
)
, |hm|2 ≥ |he|2,
0, otherwise.
(25)
Note that when there exists an external eavesdropper, obtaining
the conditional ESR, i.e., Emcs , requires the relative order of
the eavesdropper, in terms of the received SNR, among the set
of M NOMA users. If this information is not available, the
exact value of Emcs cannot be obtained. Hence, in the following
sections, we study and analyze a lower bound and an upper
bound for the ESR, which do not require any prior information
of the adversary’s relative order.
1) Lower Bound on the ESR With an External Eavesdrop-
per: From [21, ch. 15], it is noted that before the adversary
detects the mth user’s message, if we assume that the first
m−1 NOMA users’ information has already been successfully
decoded, then, we overestimate the malicious adversary’s
decoding capability. This can happen if the external eaves-
dropper attains the prior information of the first m− 1 users’
CSI. Therefore, an upper bound on R(m)e can be given by
Rˆ(m)e = log2
(
1 +
qm|he|2
Qm+1|he|2 + 1
)
, 1 ≤ m ≤M. (23)
The lower bound on the mth user’s achievable secrecy rate can
then be expressed as
R˘ms =
[
Rm − Rˆ(m)e
]+
, (24)
which can be extended to (25), shown at the top of this page.
In practice, the external eavesdropper is independent from
NOMA users, which means its channel gains can be higher or
lower than the mth user. Hence, we aim to provide a lower
bound on the ESR for the mth user, which represents an
average delay-guaranteed rate that can be at least obtained, no
matter whether the eavesdropper has a better channel condition
or not. By inserting R˘ms into (6), the lower bound on the
ESR for the mth user, i.e., E˘ms , in the presence of an external
eavesdropper, can be expressed as
E˘ms = −
1
θmTfB
ln
⎛
⎝∫∫
D1
(
Qmz1 + 1
Qm+1z1 + 1
Qm+1z2 + 1
Qmz2 + 1
)βm
×f(z1, z2) dz1 dz2 +
∫∫
D2
f(z1, z2) dz1 dz2
⎞
⎠ , (26)
where D1 = {(z1, z2), z1 ≥ z2}, and D2 = {(z1, z2), z1 <
z2}. Then, after applying the joint PDF f(z1, z2), E˘ms in (26)
can be expanded as
E˘ms = −
1
θmTfB
ln
(
ψm
∫∫
D1
(
Qmz1 + 1
Qm+1z1+1
Qm+1z2 + 1
Qmz2+1
)βm
×e
−(M−m+1)z1−z2
(1− e−z1)1−m dz1 dz2 + ψm
∫∫
D2
e−(M−m+1)z1
× (1− e−z1)m−1 e−z2 dz1 dz2
)
. (27)
To bring more insights, we approximate E˘ms at high SNRs
and provide the following theorem.
Theorem 5: Suppose that there is an external eavesdropper.
The lower bound on the ESR for the mth user, i.e., E˘ms , can
be approximated at high SNRs and given in (28), based on
the condition that γm ≤
M∑
i=m+1
γi, where m = {M − 1,M}.
E˘ms ≈
1
βm
log2
(
ψm
(
Qm+1
Qm
)−βm (
A1 +
βmqm
QmQm+1
A2
)
+ψm
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)s 1
a + 1
)
, (28)
where A1 and A2 are given by
A1 ≈
(
Qm+1
Qm
)βm m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)s
a
(
1
a + 1
− βmqm
QmQm+1
e
a+1
Qm Ei
(
−a + 1
Qm
))
, (29)
A2 ≈
(
Qm+1
Qm
)βm m−1∑
s=0
(
m−1
s
)
(−1)se aQm
(
e
1
Qm
×
(
E1
(
a + 1
Qm
)
−e− 1Qm E1
(
a
Qm
))
− βmqm
QmQm+1
e
1
Qm
×
((
r − ln (Qm) + E1
(
1
Qm
))
E1
(
a
Qm
)
+
1
2
(
ζ(2)+
(
r+ln
(
a
Qm
))2)
+e−
a
Qm
Δ∑
δ=0
eδ
(
a
Qm
)
(δ + 1)2
×
(
−1
a
)δ+1
− a
Qm
3F3
[
1, 1, 1
2, 2, 2
;− a
Qm
]))
. (30)
and a = M −m + s + 1. Furthermore, ζ(·) is the Riemann
zeta function, r is the Euler’s constant, em(x) =
m∑
s=0
xs
s!
, Δ ≥
50,11 and E1(·) is the exponential integral function [26]. For
comparison purposes, the closed-form expression for the lower
bound on ergodic secrecy rate, i.e., E[R˘ms ], is given in (31).
E[R˘ms ]
=
ψm
ln 2
(
m∑
s=0
(
m
s
)
(−1)s 1
a
(
−e aQm Ei
(
− a
Qm
)
+e
a
Qm+1 Ei
(
− a
Qm+1
))
+
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)s 1
a(a + 1)
×
(
−e
a+1
Qm+1 Ei
(
− a + 1
Qm+1
)
+e
a+1
Qm Ei
(
−a + 1
Qm
)))
.
(31)
Proof: See Appendix E.
11Here, Δ is used in a finite sum, which approximates an infinite sum. The
complete information is given in Appendix E.
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We will demonstrate the validity of the derived analytical
closed-forms in Section IV. Furthermore, in the following
lemma, we explore the impact of ρ on the proposed lower
bounds on the ergodic secrecy rate and the ESR, i.e., E[R˘ms ]
and E˘ms , given in (24) and (28).
Lemma 1: When ρ → 0, lim
ρ→0
E[R˘ms ] = 0, lim
ρ→0
E˘ms = 0.
When ρ → ∞, lim
ρ→∞E[R˘
m
s ] = 0, and lim
ρ→∞ E˘
m
s = 0.
Proof: See Appendix F.
Lemma 1 reveals that if the external eavesdropper has the prior
information of the first m−1 users’ CSI, the mth user’s achiev-
able secrecy rate at high SNRs, no matter delay-guaranteed
or delay-unguaranteed, becomes zero. Note that the above
analysis is for a constant delay exponent. In simulation results,
we will show more results for various delay requirements.
2) Upper Bound on the ESR With an External Eavesdrop-
per: If none of the first m − 1 users’ information can be
decoded when the eavesdropper intends to decode the mth
user’s message, then we underestimate the decoding ability of
the malicious adversary with SIC employed. This may happen
if the eavesdropper cannot attain any prior information of the
first m− 1 users’ CSI. Therefore, a lower bound on R(m)e is
given by
R˘(m)e = log2
(
1 +
qm|he|2
Q1|he|2 + 1
)
, 1 ≤ m ≤M. (32)
Hence, an upper bound on the secrecy rate, i.e., Rˆms , can be
written as
Rˆms
=
[
Rm − R˘(m)e
]+
=
[
log2
(
1 +
qm|hm|2
Qm+1|hm|2+1
)
−log2
(
1+
qm|he|2
Q1|he|2 + 1
)]+
=
[
log2
(
1+
qm
Qm+1+ 1|hm|2
)
−log2
(
1 +
qm
Q1 + 1|he|2
)]+
.
(33)
From (33), we can note that log2
(
1 +
qm
Qm+1 + 1|hm|2
)
≥
log2
(
1 +
qm
Q1 + 1|he|2
)
, when |he|2 ≤ |hm|2. However, when
|he|2 ≥ |hm|2, the sign cannot be distinguished. Hence, the
upper bound on the ESR for the mth user with an external
eavesdropper, i.e., Eˆms , can only be obtained numerically, by
inserting Rˆms into (6).
Although the exact analytical closed-form for the proposed
upper bound on the ESR is not available, the following lemma
is provided to explore the impact of ρ on the upper bounds on
the ergodic secrecy rate and the ESR, i.e., E[Rˆms ] and Eˆms .
Lemma 2: When ρ → 0, lim
ρ→0
E[Rˆms ] = 0, lim
ρ→0
Eˆms = 0.
When ρ → ∞, lim
ρ→∞E[Rˆ
m
s ] = limρ→∞ Eˆ
m
s =
log2
(
Qm
Qm+1
Q1
Q1 + qm
)
.
Proof: See Appendix G.
Fig. 1. EMs , vs. the transmit SNR ρ, with an internal eavesdropper.
Lemma 2 reveals that if the malicious adversary cannot
decode any of the first m − 1 users’ information, the mth
user can always achieve constant positive secrecy rates at
high SNRs, for both delay-guaranteed and delay-unguaranteed,
and the values depend on power coefficients. This result is in
agreement with previous analyses in [10] which demonstrated
that the secrecy rate in wireless multiuser networks reduces to
finite asymptotic value at high SNRs.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The accuracy of the derived analytical closed-forms and the
theoretical analysis given in Section III will be numerically
validated in this section. Further, the impact of the delay
requirements, the size of the NOMA set and the transmit
SNR on the secrecy rate and the ESR will be examined as
well, by assuming that a passive internal eavesdropper or an
external eavesdropper exists. It is assumed that the bandwidth
B = 100 kHz, the fading-block length Tf = 0.01 ms, the
power coefficients are given as γi = M−i+1μ and μ is to ensure∑M
i=1 γi = 1 [23], unless otherwise indicated. Note that a
fixed power coefficient setting is adopted in this paper. This
is because the main aim of this paper is to provide analytical
results and reveal some insights about the delay-guaranteed
secrecy rate. In future work, we will consider applying optimal
power allocation to improve the system performance through
optimally allocating available resources.
Suppose that there is an internal eavesdropper among all
NOMA users. To validate the correctness of the analytical
closed-form for lim
ρ→∞E
M
s , given in (15), we depict in Fig. 1
EMs versus the transmit SNR ρ, for different values of M .
To plot this figure, it is assumed that the power coefficient is
set to γM = 0.1 and the delay QoS exponent to θM = 0.01.
Specifically, the solid lines in Fig. 1 are obtained using Monte
Carlo simulations, and the dashed lines are plotted using
the closed-form expression, given in (15). From this figure,
one can first notice that the proposed closed-form expression
is accurate, because the Monte Carlo results at high SNRs
converge to the analytical closed-form. Furthermore, at high
SNRs, the value of EMs achieved with a larger M is smaller
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Fig. 2. EMs vs. the transmit SNR ρ, for two different power coefficient
settings, with an internal eavesdropper.
than those obtained with smaller values of M . This indicates
that for a larger set of NOMA users, the delay-guaranteed
maximum arrival rate that can be served by the strongest user
decreases, in the presence of an internal eavesdropper. The
reason is that in this case, the second best NOMA user, i.e., the
internal eavesdropper, has a high probability of having similar
channel conditions with the M th user. Since our analysis in
Section III-A show that the M th user’s ESR at high SNRs
depends on the ratio of channel gains between the M th user
and the internal eavesdropper. Hence, we can expect that when
the number of NOMA users increases, the M th user will
achieve smaller EMs values in the high SNR regime.
Note that Fig. 1 is plotted by setting a fixed power coef-
ficient for the strongest user, i.e., γM = 0.1. What if the
power coefficient γM is a value which depends on M? To
explore the influence of power coefficients, Fig. 2 is depicted
which include the curves of EMs versus the transmit SNR, with
two different power coefficient settings considered. The solid
lines show the curves by applying a fixed power coefficient
setting, while the dashed lines are plotted for the varied power
coefficient setting given in [23]. This figure first indicates
that for fixed values of ρ and M , the EMs obtained with
γM = 0.1 is larger than the one obtained with a varied power
setting. Further, for a larger value of M , the gap between
the solid line and the dashed line is larger. This is due to
the fact that by adopting the varied power coefficient setting
in [23], γM reduces with M , which results in a smaller
EMs . Fig. 2 also indicates that for a fixed M , both of the
two EMs curves, obtained with different power coefficient
settings, converge to the same maximum limit at high SNRs.
This numerically validates Theorem 3 in Section III-A, which
proves that lim
ρ→∞E
M
s approaches a constant value, irrespective
of the power coefficients.
Recall that for the adopted link-layer channel model, i.e.,
the theory of EC, the delay exponent θM represents the
exponential decay rate of the M th user’s delay violation
probability. With a smaller θM , it indicates a slower decay
rate, which allows a looser delay guarantee. Meanwhile, a
more stringent delay provisioning can be represented by a
Fig. 3. EMs and E[RMs ] vs. θM , for different values of ρ, with an internal
eavesdropper.
larger θM [6]. Hence, we depict Fig. 3 which plots EMs and
E[RMs ] versus θM , for different values of ρ, so that the impact
of θM can be investigated. The solid lines are plotted for
EMs , while the dash-dotted lines are plotted for E[RMs ]. All
solid lines and the dash-dotted lines are simulated using Monte
Carlo method. Furthermore, the dashed line in this figure is
plotted using the analytical closed-form for lim
ρ→∞E
M
s , given
in (15). Firstly, Fig. 3 shows that for a fixed ρ, the value of
EMs decreases with θM , and approaches 0 when the value
of θM becomes very large. This confirms the monotonicity
proof given in Theorem 1, which indicates that, a user with
a stringent delay requirement will have to settle for a smaller
delay-guaranteed secrecy rate, compared to one with a loose
delay constraint. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first
time that a delay-constrained secrecy rate analysis has been
performed and the trade-off between them is discussed for a
NOMA network. Furthermore, Fig. 3 also shows that when
θM → 0, the EMs value matches with the ergodic secrecy
rate E[RMs ]. This validates the theoretical conclusion proposed
in Theorem 1, which proves that the ESR converges to the
ergodic secrecy rate, when there is no delay constraint. Finally,
from Fig. 3, we can also notice that when the transmit SNR
ρ becomes larger, EMs gradually increases and approaches the
analytical limit, i.e., the dashed line.
Suppose that there is an external eavesdropper distinct from
the set of NOMA users. Fig. 4 plots the ESR for the mth user,
i.e., Ems , versus ρ, for different values of M . This figure aims
to investigate the influence of the size of the NOMA user set
on the mth user’s ESR. To plot this figure, we assume that
the eavesdropper intends to decode the 4th user’s messages,
i.e., m = 4. From Fig. 4, it is noted that when ρ increases, the
value of Ems first increases, then becomes stable at high SNRs.
Further, when M becomes larger, Ems reduces, which shows
the same trend with Fig. 1. This indicates that when the size of
the NOMA user set increases, the delay-guaranteed maximum
arrival rate that can be securely served decreases, when there
exists an external eavesdropper. Contrary to previous work
[10] with multiple users in which only the best user can be
served by the BS, in a NOMA network with power settings
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Fig. 4. Ems vs. the transmit SNR ρ, in the presence of an external
eavesdropper.
Fig. 5. Ems vs. the transmit SNR ρ, for different values of m and θm, with
an external eavesdropper.
given in [23], increasing M will reduce the power available
to each NOMA user, thus causing a decrease on the secrecy
rate and the ESR.
To investigate the ESR for different users with various delay
requirements, Fig. 5 plots the curves of Ems versus the transmit
SNR, for various settings of m and θm. This figure first shows
that for a larger value of m, the Ems value is larger. This
indicates that when there is an external eavesdropper, the user
with stronger channel conditions can achieve a higher delay-
guaranteed rate. Furthermore, Fig. 5 also shows that for a
specific user, the Ems obtained with θm → 0 is larger than
the one achieved with θm = 1. This is because the scenario of
θm → 0 represents a no-delay-guaranteed situation, in which
the delay violation probability approaches 1. Fig. 5 further
shows that the gap of the Ems values between θm = 1 and
θm → 0 is larger for a larger value of m. This implies that
a user with higher channel gains will have to make more
sacrifices on its ESR value, so that the required statistical delay
constraint can be satisfied.
In Section III-B.1, we proposed and analyzed a lower bound
on the ESR for the mth user, denoted as E˘ms , by overestimating
Fig. 6. Ems and E˘ms vs. the delay exponent θm, for different values of ρ,
with an external eavesdropper.
Fig. 7. E˘ms vs. the transmit SNR ρ, for different θm values, with an external
eavesdropper.
the decoding capability of the external eavesdropper. Here,
we include Fig. 6 which plots the curves of Ems (in solid
lines) and the lower bound E˘ms (in dashed lines) versus θm,
for different values of ρ. To plot this figure, it is assumed
that there are 8 NOMA users in total, i.e., M = 8, and
the external eavesdropper intends to decode the 6th user’s
messages, i.e., m = 6. All curves shown in this figure are
obtained using Monte Carlo simulation results. From Fig. 6,
we first notice that both Ems and E˘ms decrease with θm,
which indicates that with an external eavesdropper existing,
the achievable delay-guaranteed secrecy rate becomes smaller,
when the user’s delay requirement becomes more stringent.
This numerically confirms the theoretical analysis given in
Theorem 1. Furthermore, Fig. 6 shows that the proposed lower
bound E˘ms serves as a good lower bound for small SNR
regime, and with the decrease of ρ, the gap between Ems and
E˘ms reduces.
To validate the accuracy of the closed-form expression for
E˘ms , we include Fig. 7 which shows E˘ms versus ρ, for various
values of θm. The solid lines are plotted using the Monte
Carlo results, while the dashed lines are shown using the
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Fig. 8. Ems and Eˆms vs. the delay exponent θm, for different values of ρ,
with an external eavesdropper.
analytical results given in Theorem 5. Note that the given
closed-form expression is valid only when γm ≤
M∑
i=m+1
γi,
with m = {M − 1,M}. Hence, to plot Fig. 7, we apply the
power coefficient settings given in [23], i.e., γi = M−i+1μ ,
where μ is to ensure
∑M
i=1 γi = 1. By setting M = 8, m = 6,
we can calculate the power coefficient values and find that
γm ≤
M∑
i=m+1
γi is satisfied. Fig. 7 first shows that when the
transmit SNR gradually increases, the analytical closed-form
results match with the Monte Carlo results, which confirms the
validity of the derived closed-form at high SNRs. Furthermore,
both the analytical and simulation results approach 0, at high
SNRs. This confirms Lemma 1 in Section III-B.1.
In Section III-B.2, by underestimating the external eaves-
dropper’s decoding capability, we proposed an upper bound
on the ESR for the mth user, denoted as Eˆms . To confirm the
validity of the upper bound and to further investigate, Fig. 8
is plotted which includes the simulated Ems values (in solid
lines) and the upper bound Eˆms (in dashed lines) versus θm,
for different values of ρ. Similar to Fig. 6, Fig. 8 also shows
that both the Ems and the upper bound Eˆms decrease with θm.
This is due to the fact that with a larger θm indicating a more
stringent statistical delay guarantee, the maximum achievable
arrival rate which can be securely supported becomes smaller
[6]. Furthermore, Fig. 8 also shows that the proposed Eˆms can
serve as a good upper bound, for relatively small transmit SNR
values.
V. CONCLUSION
The delay-guaranteed secrecy rate, namely, ESR, has been
introduced and investigated for a downlink NOMA network;
ESR represents the maximum constant arrival rate which can
be securely served by a legitimate user, while guaranteeing
the required statistical delay constraints. Two eavesdropping
scenarios have been considered: a purely antagonistic network
with an unknown internal eavesdropper and a trustworthy
NOMA network with an external eavesdropper. Assuming an
internal eavesdropper exists, a closed-form expression for the
ESR at high SNRs has been derived for the strongest user,
which is the only user guaranteed to have a positive ESR
in this case. Assuming that an external eavesdropper exists
and has interest in jeopardizing the security of the network,
a lower bound and an upper bound on the ESR have been
proposed, respectively, and have been shown to be tight in
the low SNR regime. Simulation results have shown that for
both eavesdropping scenarios, a user with a stringent delay
requirement serves a smaller amount of ESR, comparing to
those with relatively loose delay constraints. Further, it has
been shown that a legitimate NOMA user with higher channel
gains will make greater sacrifices on its ESR value, so that a
required statistical delay guarantee can be satisfied.
APPENDIX A
PROOF FOR THEOREM 1
Recall that the ESR for the mth user, i.e., Ems , is calculated
by inserting the achievable secrecy rate Rms into (6), which is
then given by
Ems = −
1
θmTfB
ln
(
E
[
e−θmTfBR
m
s
])
. (34)
Note that e−θmTfBRms is a log-convex function in θm because
ln
(
e−θmTfBR
m
s
)
= −θmTfBRms is a convex function in
θm [29]. Since the log-convexity still holds under sum-
mations, therefore we could conclude that E
[
e−θmTfBR
m
s
]
is also a log-convex function in θm. Hence, it is
clear that ln
(
E
[
e−θmTfBR
m
s
])
is convex, which means
− ln (E [e−θmTfBRms ]) is a concave function in θm.
We rewrite Ems as
f(θm)
g(θm)
, where f(θm) =
− ln (E [e−θmTfBRms ]) and g(θm) = θmTfB. In order
to prove that Ems is a monotonically decreasing function in
θm, we take the first derivative of Ems , which gives
∂Ems
∂θm
=
(
f(θm)
g(θm)
)′
=
f ′(θm)g(θm)− g′(θm)f(θm)
(g(θm))
2 . (35)
Apparently, the denominator is a non-negative value. Let us
consider the numerator only. We take the first derivative of the
denominator and it gives
(f ′(θm)g(θm)− g′(θm)f(θm))′
= f ′′(θm)g(θm)− g′′(θm)f(θm), (36)
which can be simplified as f ′′(θm)g(θm) because g′′(θm) = 0.
Since we have proved that f(θm) is a concave function,
i.e., f ′′(θm) ≤ 0, and also g(θm) ≥ 0, therefore it
can be concluded that the numerator in (35) is a non-
increasing function. Furthermore, it is easy to see that
the numerator in (35) equals to 0 when θm = 0, i.e.,
f ′(θm)g(θm)− g′(θm)f(θm)|θm=0 = 0. Finally, we can con-
clude that ∂E
m
s
∂θm
≤ 0, which implies that Ems monotonically
decreases with θm.12
12The conclusion of monotonicity is obtained by excluding the possibility
of Ems being a constant value, with respect to θm.
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When θm → 0, we can obtain that
lim
θm→0
Ems = lim
θm→0
−
(
E
[
e−θmTfBR
m
s
])′
TfBE [e−θmTfBR
m
s ]
(37)
= lim
θm→0
−E
[
e−θmTfBR
m
s (−TfBRms )
]
TfBE [e−θmTfBR
m
s ]
(38)
= E [Rms ] . (39)
Hence, this proves that when θm → 0, Ems converges to the
ergodic secrecy rate E [Rms ].
When θm →∞, from (5), one can note that the probability
of the delay exceeding a given delay bound approaches zero.
It means that the user cannot tolerate any delay outage, which
refers to the delay-limited scenario. According to [30], it
shows that Rayleigh channel cannot support very stringent
delay QoS requirement (when θ is extremely large), even using
the optimal power policy. Our simulation results also confirm
that the ESR becomes zero in this case.
APPENDIX B
PROOF FOR THEOREM 2
According to the theory of order statistics and by inserting
(10) into (9), EMs can be written as
EMs =
1
βM
log2
(
M(M − 1)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
x
(
1 + qMy
1 + qMx
)βM
×f(x) (F (x))M−2 f(y) dy dx
)
=
1
βM
log2
(
M(M − 1)
∫ ∞
0
(
1
1 + qMx
)βM
e−x
×(1− e−x)M−2 ∫ ∞
x
(1 + qMy)
βM e−y dy dx
)
. (40)
Consider E1sc =
∫∞
x (1 + qMy)
βM e−y dy first. By setting
z1 = 1qM + y, E
1
sc can be transformed into E1sc =
qβMM e
1
qM
∫∞
1
qM
+x z
βM
1 e
−z1 dz1. Then, from (3.381.6) in [31],
we note that∫ ∞
u
e−x
xv
dx = u−
v
2 e−
u
2 W− v2 , 1−v2 (u) [u > 0], (41)
where Wk,μ(z) is the Whittaker W function [26]. By applying
(41), E1sc can be given as
E1sc=q
βM
M e
1
qM
(
1
qM
+x
)βM
2
e
− 12qM−
x
2 WβM
2 ,
1+βM
2
(
1
qM
+x
)
.
(42)
Finally, by inserting E1sc into (40), EMs can be given as
EMs =
1
βM
log2
(
M(M − 1)q
βM
2
M e
1
2qM
∫ ∞
0
(1 + qMx)
−βM2
× e− 32x (1− e−x)M−2 WβM
2 ,
1+βM
2
(
1
qM
+ x
)
dx
)
= AM +
1
βM
log2
(∫ ∞
0
(1 + qMx)−βM e−x
× (1− e−x)M−2 Γ(1 + βM , 1
qM
+ x
)
dx
)
, (43)
where AM = 1βM log2
(
M(M − 1)qβMM e
1
qM
)
, and Γ(·, ·)
is the incomplete Γ function. Making use of the Binomial
theorem we have that
(1− e−x)M−2 =
M−2∑
ν=0
(
M − 2
ν
)
(−1)νe−νx, (44)
so that the following integral appears∫ ∞
0
(1 + qMx)−βM e−(ν+1)xΓ
(
1 + βM ,
1
qM
+ x
)
dx
=
∫ ∞
1/qM
(qM z)−βM e
−(ν+1)(z− 1qM )Γ(1 + βM , z) dz (45a)
= q−βMM e
ν+1
qM
∫ ∞
1/qM
z−βM e−(ν+1)zΓ(1 + βM , z) dz, (45b)
by change of variable z = x + 1qM . We set Iν =∫∞
1/qM
z−βM e−(ν+1)zΓ(1 + βM , z) dz, so that
EMsc =BM +
1
βM
log2
(
M−2∑
ν=0
(
M−2
ν
)
(−1)νe νqM Iν
)
, (46)
where BM =
log2(M(M−1))+2q−1M
βM
. To evaluate Iν we will use
the following property∫
xbΓ(s, x) dx =
1
b+1
(
xb+1Γ(s, x)−Γ(s + b + 1, x)) , (47)
and note that the limit of the right-hand side (RHS) for
x → ∞ is 0. To have only powers of z in Iν , we resort in
using the Taylor series expansion for the exponential function
e−(ν+1)z =
∑∞
k=0
(−1)k(ν+1)kzk
k! . Hence, Iν becomes
Iν =
∞∑
k=0
(−1)k(ν + 1)k
k!
∫ ∞
1
qM
zk−βM Γ (1 + βM , z) dx
= −
∞∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
(ν + 1)k
k − βM + 1
[(
1
qM
)k−βM+1
×Γ
(
1+βM ,
1
qM
)
−Γ
(
1+βM+k−βM +1, 1
qM
)]
=
∞∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
(ν + 1)k
k − βM + 1
[
Γ
(
k + 2,
1
qM
)
−
(
1
qM
)k−βM+1
Γ
(
1 + βM ,
1
qM
)]
, (48)
and finally
EMsc = BM +
1
βM
log2
(
M−2∑
ν=0
(
M − 2
ν
)
(−1)νe νqM
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×
∞∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
(ν + 1)k
k − βM + 1
[
Γ
(
k + 2,
1
qM
)
−
(
1
qM
)k−βM+1
Γ
(
1 + βM ,
1
qM
)])
. (49)
APPENDIX C
PROOF FOR THEOREM 3
By applying the theory of order statistics and inserting
(10) into (14), the M th user’s ESR at high SNRs can be
given by
lim
ρ→∞E
M
s =
1
βM
log2
(
M(M − 1)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
x
(y
x
)βM
×f(x) (F (x))M−2 f(y) dy dx
)
(50a)
=
1
βM
log2
(
M(M − 1)
∫ ∞
0
(
1
x
)βM
e−x
(
1− e−x)M−2 × ∫ ∞
x
yβM e−y dy dx
)
.
(50b)
Then, by applying (41) to (50b), one can get that
lim
ρ→∞E
M
s =
1
βM
log2
(
M(M − 1)
∫ ∞
0
(
1
x
)βM
e−x
× (1− e−x)M−2 xβM2 e− x2 WβM
2 ,
1+βM
2
(x) dx
)
.
(51)
Further, by using the binomial expansion and expanding
(1− e−x)M−2 as
M−2∑
s=0
(
M−2
s
)
(−1)se−xs, (51) can be trans-
formed into
lim
ρ→∞E
M
s =
1
βM
log2
(
M(M − 1)
M−2∑
s=0
(
M − 2
s
)
(−1)s
×
∫ ∞
0
x−
βM
2 e−(
3
2+s)xWβM
2 ,
1+βM
2
(x) dx
)
.
(52)
From (13.23.4) in [26], we note that∫ ∞
0
e−zttw−1Wk,μ(t) dt
= Γ
(
1
2
+ μ + w
)
Γ
(
1
2
− μ + w
)
×2F1
[ 1
2 − μ + w, 12 + μ + w
w − k + 1 ;
1
2
− z
]
×
[
Re
(
w +
1
2
)
> |Re(μ)|, Re(z) > −1
2
]
, (53)
where 2F1
[
a, b
c ; z
]
is the generalized hypergeometric func-
tion, and Γ(·) is the gamma function. By applying (53)
to (52), the closed-form expression for lim
ρ→∞E
M
s can be finally
expressed as
lim
ρ→∞E
M
s =
1
βM
log2
(
M(M − 1)Γ(1− βM )
×
M−2∑
s=0
(
M − 2
s
)
(−1)s2F1
[
1− βM , 2
2− βM ;−1− s
])
.
Then, for comparison purposes, here we derive the closed-
form expression for the ergodic secrecy rate for the M th
user at high SNRs, i.e., lim
ρ→∞E[R
M
s ]. Firstly, we note that
lim
ρ→∞E[R
M
s ] = E
[
log2
(
|hM |2
|hM−1|2
)]
, which can be expanded
as follows, after inserting the joint PDF (10).
lim
ρ→∞E[R
M
s ] = M(M − 1)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
x
log2
( y
x
)
e−x
×(1− e−x)M−2e−y dy dx. (54)
By defining z0 =
y
x
and 1 ≤ z0 ≤ ∞, (54) can be rewritten as
lim
ρ→∞E[R
M
s ] = M(M − 1)
∫ ∞
0
xe−x(1− e−x)M−2
×
∫ ∞
1
log2(z0)e
−xz0 dz0 dx (55)
=
M(M − 1)
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
xe−x(1− e−x)M−2
×
∫ ∞
1
ln(z0)e−xz0 dz0 dx. (56)
From (4.331.2) in [31], we have that∫ ∞
1
e−μx lnxdx = − 1
μ
Ei(−μ), Re μ > 0. (57)
By applying (57), we get that
lim
ρ→∞E[R
M
s ] =
M(M − 1)
ln 2
M−2∑
s=0
(
M − 2
s
)
(−1)s
×
∫ ∞
0
e−(s+1)xE1(x) dx, (58)
obtained after using (1 − e−x)M−2 =
M−2∑
s=0
(
M−2
s
)
(−1)se−xs
and Ei(−x) = −E1(x), for x > 0. From (4.2.3) in [32], we
have that ∫ ∞
0
e−axE1(bx) dx =
1
a
ln
(
1 +
a
b
)
. (59)
Hence, by applying (59), we finally obtain the close-form
expression for the ergodic secrecy rate at high SNRs,
given as
lim
ρ→∞E[R
M
s ] = M(M − 1)
×
M−2∑
s=0
(
M − 2
s
)
(−1)s 1
s + 1
log2 (s + 2) .
(60)
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APPENDIX D
PROOF FOR THEOREM 4
By inserting the joint PDF f(z1, z2) into (20), Emcs is
given by
Emcs =
1
βm
log2
(∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
(
Qmz1 + 1
Qm+1z1 + 1
× (QME+1 − qm) z2 + 1
QME+1z2 + 1
)βm
f(z1, z2) dz1 dz2
)
.
(61)
Here, f(z1, z2) = f(m)(z1)f(z2), where f(m)(z1) =
ψmf(z1)F (z1)m−1 (1− F (z1))M−m, f(z1) = e−z1 ,
F (z1) = 1 − e−z1 , and f(z2) = e−z2 . Then, Emcs can be
extended as
Emcs =
1
βm
log2
(
ψm
∫ ∞
0
(
(QME+1 − qm) z2 + 1
QME+1z2 + 1
)βm
e−z2
×
∫ ∞
0
(
Qmz1 + 1
Qm+1z1 + 1
)βm
e−(M−m+1)z1
× (1− e−z1)m−1 dz1 dz2
)
. (62)
By replacing (1− e−z1)m−1 with binominal expansion
m−1∑
s=0
(
m−1
s
)
(−1)se−z1s and defining a = M − m + s + 1,
we can get that
Emcs =
1
βm
log2
(
ψm
∫ ∞
0
(
(QME+1 − qm) z2 + 1
QME+1z2 + 1
)βm
e−z2
×
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)s
∫ ∞
0
(
Qmz1 + 1
Qm+1z1 + 1
)βm
×e−az1 dz1 dz2
)
. (63)
To simplify the above equation, we define AD1 and AD2 as
follows and Emcs can be written as
Emcs =
1
βm
log2 (ψmAD1AD2 ) , (64a)
AD1 =
m−1∑
s=0
(
m−1
s
)
(−1)s
∫ ∞
0
(
Qmz1+1
Qm+1z1+1
)βm
e−az1 dz1,
(64b)
AD2 =
∫ ∞
0
(
(QME+1 − qm) z2 + 1
QME+1z2 + 1
)βm
e−z2 dz2. (64c)
Let us focus on AD1 first. It can be further expressed as
AD1 =
(
Qm+1
Qm
)−βm ∫ ∞
0
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)s
×
(
1 +
qm
Qm+1
Qmz1 + 1
)−βm
e−az1 dz1. (65a)
By assuming that qm ≤ Qm+1, where m = {M − 1,M},(
1 +
qm
Qm+1
Qmz1+1
)−βm
can be approximated using the first two
terms of generalized binomial expansion. Then, (65a) can be
approximated as:
AD1 ≈
(
Qm+1
Qm
)−βm(∫ ∞
0
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)se−az1 dz1
−βmqm
Qm+1
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)s
∫ ∞
0
e−az1
Qmz1 + 1
dz1
)
.
(66)
From (3.352.4) in [31], we have that∫ ∞
0
e−μx
x+β
dx =−eβμEi(−μβ), |argβ|<π, Re μ>0. (67)
Then, by applying (67), AD1 becomes
AD1 ≈
(
Qm+1
Qm
)−βm (m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)s 1
a
+
βmqm
Qm+1Qm
×
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)se aQm Ei
(
− a
Qm
))
. (68)
Then, we can start to consider AD2 , which can be
expressed as
AD2 =
(
QME+1 − qm
QME+1
)βm ∫ ∞
0
(
1 +
qm
QME+1−qm
QME+1z2 + 1
)βm
×e−z2 dz2 (69)
≈
(
QME+1−qm
QME+1
)βm (∫ ∞
0
e−z2 dz2+
βmqm
QME+1−qm
×
∫ ∞
0
e−z2
QME+1z2 + 1
dz2
)
(70)
≈
(
QME+1 − qm
QME+1
)βm (
1− βmqm
(QME+1 − qm)QME+1
×e
1
QME+1 Ei
(
− 1
QME+1
))
. (71)
Finally, by inserting AD1 and AD2 into (64a), the Emcs for the
mth user is given by (22).
At high SNRs, for the mth user with m ≥ ME+1, lim
ρ→∞E
m
cs
is given by
lim
ρ→∞E
m
cs =
1
βm
log2
(
E
[(
Qm
Qm+1
QME+1 − qm
QME+1
)βm])
= log2
(
Qm
Qm+1
QME+1 − qm
QME+1
)
. (72)
APPENDIX E
PROOF FOR THEOREM 5
Recall that E˘ms can be expressed as
E˘ms =
1
βm
log2 (BD1 + BD2) , (73)
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where
BD1 = ψm
∫∫
D1
(
Qmz1 + 1
Qm+1z1 + 1
Qm+1z2 + 1
Qmz2 + 1
)βm
×e
−(M−m+1)z1−z2
(1− e−z1)1−m dz1 dz2, (74a)
BD2 = ψm
∫∫
D2
e−(M−m+1)z1
(
1− e−z1)m−1 e−z2 dz1 dz2.
(74b)
First, let us consider BD2 . By replacing (1− e−z1)m−1 with
m−1∑
s=0
(
m−1
s
)
(−1)se−z1s, we get that
BD2 = ψm
∫ ∞
0
e−z2
∫ z2
0
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)se−az1 dz1 dz2
(75a)
= ψm
m−1∑
s=0
(
m−1
s
)
(−1)s
(
−1
a
)∫ ∞
0
e−z2
(
e−az2−1) dz2
(75b)
= ψm
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)s 1
a + 1
. (75c)
Then, we can consider BD1 . Let us define BBD1(z2) and
rewrite BD1 as follows:
BD1 = ψm
∫ ∞
0
(
Qm+1z2+1
Qmz2+1
)βm
e−z2BBD1(z2) dz2,
(76a)
BBD1(z2) =
∫ ∞
z2
(
Qmz1 + 1
Qm+1z1 + 1
)βm
e−(M−m+1)z1
× (1− e−z1)m−1 dz1, (76b)
where BBD1(z2) can be written as
BBD1(z2) =
(
Qm+1
Qm
)−βm m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)s
×
∫ ∞
z2
(
1 +
qm
Qm+1
Qmz1 + 1
)−βm
e−az1 dz1. (77)
By assuming that qm ≤ Qm+1, where m = {M − 1,M},(
1 +
qm
Qm+1
Qmz1 + 1
)−βm
can be approximated using the first
two terms of generalized binomial expansion. Then, (77) can
be approximated as
BBD1(z2) ≈
(
Qm+1
Qm
)−βm m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)s
×
(∫ ∞
z2
e−az1 dz1 − βmqm
Qm+1
∫ ∞
z2
e−az1
Qmz1 + 1
dz1
)
. (78)
From (3.352.2) in [31], we have that∫ ∞
u
e−μx
x + β
dx = −eβμEi(−μu− μβ),
u ≥ 0, |arg(u + β)| < π, Re μ > 0. (79)
Then, BBD1(z2) can be finally approximated as
BBD1(z2) ≈
(
Qm+1
Qm
)−βm m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)s
×
(
e−az2
a
+
βmqm
QmQm+1
e
a
Qm Ei
(
−az2 − a
Qm
))
. (80)
By inserting BBD1(z2) back into BD1 , we get (81), shown at
the top of the next page. To simplify, (81) can be rewritten as
BD1 = ψm
(
Qm+1
Qm
)−βm (
A1 +
βmqm
QmQm+1
A2
)
. (82)
Let us consider A1 first.
A1 =
(
Qm+1
Qm
)βm m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)s
a
×
∫ ∞
0
(
1 +
qm
Qm+1
Qmz2 + 1
)βm
e−(a+1)z2 dz2,
≈
(
Qm+1
Qm
)βm m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)s
a
×
(∫ ∞
0
e−(a+1)z2 dz2+
βmqm
Qm+1
∫ ∞
0
e−(a+1)z2
Qmz2 + 1
dz2
)
,
(83)
which is approximated by applying the first two terms of the
generalized binomial expansion. By applying (3.352.4) in [31],
given in (67), we can get that
A1 ≈
(
Qm+1
Qm
)βm m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)s
a
×
(
1
a + 1
− βmqm
QmQm+1
e
a+1
Qm Ei
(
−a + 1
Qm
))
. (84)
Now we can start to work on A2. Recall that
A2 =
(
Qm+1
Qm
)βm m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)se aQm
×
∫ ∞
0
(
1+
qm
Qm+1
Qmz2 + 1
)βm
e−z2Ei
(
−az2− a
Qm
)
dz2.
(85)
in which
(
1 +
qm
Qm+1
Qmz2 + 1
)βm
can be approximated using the
first two terms of the generalized binomial expansion. Then,
A2 can be transformed into
A2 ≈
(
Qm+1
Qm
)βm m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)se aQm
×
(∫ ∞
0
e−z2Ei
(
−az2 − a
Qm
)
dz2
+
βmqm
Qm+1
∫ ∞
0
1
Qmz2+1
e−z2Ei
(
−az2 − a
Qm
)
dz2
)
.
(86)
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BD1 = ψm
(
Qm+1
Qm
)−βm
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)s
a
∫ ∞
0
(
Qm+1z2 + 1
Qmz2 + 1
)βm
e−(a+1)z2 dz2︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
+
βmqm
QmQm+1
×
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)se aQm
∫ ∞
0
(
Qm+1z2 + 1
Qmz2 + 1
)βm
e−z2Ei
(
−az2 − a
Qm
)
dz2︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , (81)
By setting y = az2 + aQm and
a
Qm
≤ y ≤ ∞, A2 can be
rewritten as
A2 ≈
(
Qm+1
Qm
)βm m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
(−1)se aQm
×
(
−1
a
e
1
Qm
∫ ∞
a
Qm
e−
1
ayE1 (y) dy
− βmqm
QmQm+1
e
1
Qm
∫ ∞
a
Qm
e−
1
ayE1(y)
1
y
dy
)
. (87)
From (4.2.1) in [32], we have that∫
e−uxE1(vx) dx =
1
u
(
E1((u+v)x)−e−uxE1(vx)
)
. (88)
By applying (88), we get that∫ ∞
a
Qm
e−
1
a yE1 (y) dy
= −a
(
E1
(
a + 1
Qm
)
− e− 1Qm E1
(
a
Qm
))
. (89)
Further, from (4.2.29) in [32], we have that∫ ∞
c
e−uxE1(vx)
1
x
dx
= (r + ln(uc) + E1(uc))E1(vc)
+
1
2
(
ζ(2)+(r+ln(vc))2
)
+e−vc
∞∑
δ=0
eδ(vc)
(δ + 1)2
(
−u
v
)δ+1
+
∞∑
δ=1
(−vc)δ
δ!δ2
. (90)
By applying (90), we get that∫ ∞
a
Qm
e−
1
a yE1(y)
1
y
dy
=
(
r − ln (Qm) + E1
(
1
Qm
))
×E1
(
a
Qm
)
+
1
2
(
ζ(2) +
(
r + ln
(
a
Qm
))2)
+e−
a
Qm
∞∑
δ=0
eδ
(
a
Qm
)
(δ + 1)2
(
−1
a
)δ+1
+
∞∑
δ=1
(
− aQm
)δ
δ!δ2
. (91)
For simplicity, we define two notations, i.e., Ψ1 =
∞∑
δ=0
eδ
(
a
Qm
)
(δ + 1)2
(
−1
a
)δ+1
and Ψ2 =
∞∑
δ=1
(
− aQm
)δ
δ!δ2
. In the
following, we will show that both infinite summations, i.e.,
Ψ1 and Ψ2, can be calculated easily. Let us rewrite Ψ1
as lim
Δ→∞
Δ∑
δ=0
eδ
(
a
Qm
)
(δ + 1)2
(
−1
a
)δ+1
. One can easily show that
Ψ1 can be approximated using a finite summation, which
converges for any values as long as Δ ≥ 50. Furthermore, by
applying the definition of generalized hypergeometric function
[26], we can replace Ψ2 with − a
Qm
3F3
[
1, 1, 1
2, 2, 2 ;−
a
Qm
]
.
Henceforth, A2 can be finally expressed as
A2 ≈
(
Qm+1
Qm
)βm m−1∑
s=0
(
m−1
s
)
(−1)se aQm
(
e
1
Qm
×
(
E1
(
a + 1
Qm
)
−e− 1Qm E1
(
a
Qm
))
− βmqm
QmQm+1
e
1
Qm
×
((
r−ln(Qm) + E1
(
1
Qm
))
E1
(
a
Qm
)
+
1
2
(
ζ(2) +
(
r + ln
(
a
Qm
))2)
+ e−
a
Qm
∞∑
δ=0
eδ
(
a
Qm
)
(δ + 1)2
×
(
−1
a
)δ+1
− a
Qm
3F3
[
1, 1, 1
2, 2, 2
;− a
Qm
]))
. (92)
By inserting A1, A2, and BD2 into (73), E˘ms can be finally
given in (28)-(30).
Then, we can start to derive the closed-form expression for
E[R˘ms ], given in (93), shown at the top of the next page. Since
B1-B4 have similar structures, here we only show the steps
of deriving B1 for simplicity.
B1 =ψm
∫ ∞
0
log2 (Qmz1 + 1) e
−(M−m+1)z1 (1− e−z1)m−1
×
∫ z1
0
e−z2 dz2 dz1 (94a)
= ψm
∫ ∞
0
log2(Qmz1+1) e
−(M−m+1)z1(1− e−z1)m dz1
(94b)
= ψm
m∑
s=0
(
m
s
)
(−1)s
∫ ∞
0
log2 (Qmz1 + 1) e
−az1 dz1.
(94c)
YU et al.: EFFECTIVE SECRECY RATE FOR A DOWNLINK NOMA NETWORK 5689
E[R˘ms ] =
∫∫
D1
(
log2
(
1 +
qmz1
Qm+1z1 + 1
)
− log2
(
1 +
qmz2
Qm+1z2 + 1
))
f(z1, z2) dz1 dz2
=
∫∫
D1
log2 (Qmz1 + 1) f(z1, z2) dz1 dz2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B1
−
∫∫
D1
log2(Qm+1z1 + 1)f(z1, z2) dz1 dz2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B2
−
∫∫
D1
log2(Qmz2 + 1)f(z1, z2) dz1 dz2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B3
+
∫∫
D1
log2(Qm+1z2 + 1)f(z1, z2) dz1 dz2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B4
. (93)
By defining Qmz1 = x, B1 can be transformed to
B1 = ψm
1
Qm
m∑
s=0
(
m
s
)
(−1)s
∫ ∞
0
log2 (x + 1) e
− aQm x dx.
(95)
From (4.337.2) in [31], we have that∫ ∞
0
e−ux ln(1 + vx) dx = − 1
u
e
u
v Ei
(
−u
v
)
,
|arg v| < π, Re u > 0. (96)
By applying (96), B1 can be finally written as
B1 = −ψmln 2
m∑
s=0
(
m
s
)
(−1)s 1
a
e
a
Qm Ei(− a
Qm
). (97)
By following similar methods, B2-B4 can also be expressed
in closed-form and finally, E[R˘ms ] is given in (31).
APPENDIX F
PROOF FOR LEMMA 1
Note that the lower bound on the ergodic secrecy rate, i.e.,
E[R˘ms ], is given by
E[R˘ms ] = E
[
log2
(
1 +
qm|hm|2
Qm+1|hm|2 + 1
)
− log2
(
1 +
qm|he|2
Qm+1|he|2 + 1
)]
. (98)
By inserting ρ → 0 (which means qm = 0 and Qm+1 = 0)
into (98), one can get that E[R˘ms ] = 0. Also, by inserting
ρ→ 0 into (26), we can get that lim
ρ→0
E˘ms = 0.
When ρ→∞, E[R˘ms ] can be approximated as
E[R˘ms ] = E
[
log2
(
1 +
qm|hm|2
Qm+1|hm|2
)
− log2
(
1 +
qm|he|2
Qm+1|he|2
)]
, (99)
which equals to 0. Also, by inserting ρ → ∞ into (26), we
can get that lim
ρ→∞ E˘
m
s = 0.
APPENDIX G
PROOF FOR LEMMA 2
By inserting ρ→ 0 into Rˆms , one can easily get that Rˆms = 0
and E[Rˆms ] = 0. Then, by inserting lim
ρ→0
Rˆms = 0 into (6), it
is clear that lim
ρ→0
Eˆms = 0.
On the other hand, when ρ→∞, lim
ρ→∞ Rˆ
m
s can be written
as
lim
ρ→∞ Rˆ
m
s =
[
log2
(
1+
qm
Qm+1
)
−log2
(
1+
qm
Q1
)]+
, (100)
which is a positive value. Then, we can get that lim
ρ→∞E[Rˆ
m
s ] =
log2
(
Qm
Qm+1
Q1
Q1+qm
)
. By inserting (100) into (6), we can
notice that lim
ρ→∞ Eˆ
m
s = lim
ρ→∞E[Rˆ
m
s ], which completes the
proof.
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